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THE DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL BUFFER IN THE 
MACEDONIAN BANKING SECTOR
Milan Eliskovski, MSc1
Abstract
Capital buffer is the excess of capital that banks have above the legally prescribed minimum 
and has a very important role for preserving the stability of the banking sector, especially 
in economies where banks are the main source of funding. The capital buffer of banks is 
very important to maintain their solvency, and to maintain the potential for unconstrained 
provision of loans in the economy. From this perspective, the question that arises is: which 
factors determine its movement? The econometric analysis in this paper is made by the 
use of the Johansen cointegration technique (Vector Error Correction Model - VECM) 
applied to quarterly time series of the banking sector, covering the period from 2003Q2 to 
2013Q3. The findings of this study suggest that the capital buffer of the banking sector in 
the Republic of Macedonia is determined by the credit risk, market risk and profitability. The 
recommendations provided in this paper are that prudent measures to maintain the stability 
of banks in the country be taken.
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Introduction
Banks occupy an important place in the modern financial sectors and their operation is 
subject to regulation, supervision and risk control with the main purpose of preserving the 
financial stability. From that perspective, a banks’ capital is a key element to maintaining 
their solvency. Many countries in the world have accepted the Basel Accords which define 
minimum rate of capital adequacy of 8%. The excess of capital that banks hold above this 
minimum prescribed rate is a buffer that ensures the stability of banks i.e. the more capital 
a bank holds, the greater the possibility of absorbing unexpected losses in the event of an 
economic downturn. According to Tabak et al. (2011) and Atici and Gursoy (2013),  banks 
maintain a capital buffer for a number of reasons such as: (1) to reflect their stability and 
to absorb smoothly the unexpected losses in case of eventual materialization of the risks 
to which banks are exposed, (2) to meet the requirements set by the regulator in terms of 
maintaining the minimum required level of capital and thus avoid the costs and sanctions 
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for adjustment of capital to the required level and (3) by maintaining a capital buffer, banks 
reflect market discipline to economic agents in such manner as to have credit potential and 
thus be able to extend loans in an unconstrained manner.
Having in mind the importance of banks’ capital buffer to maintain their solvency, and the 
potential that it provides for unconstrained lending, the question that arises is: which factors 
determine its movement? The importance of conducting such research is the following: 
(1) investigating the determinants of capital buffer of the banking sector in the Republic of 
Macedonia (RM) would allow the policy makers insight into the mechanism for managing 
risks associated with banks’ capital buffer; (2) by finding out the determinants affecting 
the banks’ capital buffer and the way they affect, the National Bank of the Republic of 
Macedonia (NBRM) could take appropriate macro-prudential measures to maintain the 
capital buffer and preserve the stability of the banking sector; (3) also, this research question 
is significant for NBRM in terms of facilitating the transmission mechanism of the monetary 
policy. Namely, in terms of economic expansion, the banks exhibiting prudent behavior 
extend loans in increased volume and they increase their capital in parallel. If the banks do 
not behave in this manner, then when facing economic recession and subsequently, credit 
risk losses are materializing and the capital is becoming expensive, the banks are likely to 
reduce or stop lending in order to maintain the capital adequacy rate above the minimum 
prescribed. In this case, the signals given by NBRM, for example by reducing the reference 
interest rate in order to boost lending, will have no effect because the banks are concerned 
about their ability to maintain the level of capital above the required level.
Further in this paper, the theory of determinants of capital buffer will be explained and an 
overview of the empirical literature that deals with this issue will be given. Additionally, the 
variables will be specified for the econometric investigation of the determinants of capital 
buffer and the results will be explained. Finally, appropriate conclusion and recommendations 
to policy makers will be provided.
Theoretical model
Ayuso et al. (2002) explains the theoretical model of determinants of the capital buffer. The 
starting point of this theoretical model is the investment equation with quadratic adjustment 
costs used to explain the dynamic of the bank’s capital stock.
                                                                    (1)
 
In the equation 1,Kt is the capital at the end of the period t, Kt-1 is the capital at the end 
of the previous period and It is the flow of the capital i.e. shares issued or repurchased, 
and retained earnings at the period t. Furthermore, the equation 1 is accompanied by the 
below given equation 2 for encompassing the costs of holding the capital i.e. this equation 
represents the trade-off among three types of costs for holding capital.
                                                                                                                                            (2)
Ct are the total costs of holding capital, αt is the cost of remunerating the shareholders (in 
fact this is the cost of capital i.e. the rate of return of the equity), γt is the cost of the bank’s 
exposure to risks i.e. the losses that would arise in case of materialization of the bank’s risk 
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exposure (this costs are predominantly arising from the credit risk) and δt is the adjustment 
cost i.e. this cost is the transaction cost arising at the capital market so that the bank will 
obtain the sufficient level of capital.
Having in mind the equations 1 and 2, the bank determines the capital by minimizing the 
total costs of holding the capital represented by the equation 3.
                   (3)
Based on equation 3, the identification of It from the equation 2 is in the following equation 4.
                    (4)
By replacing the equation 1 into equation 4, the equation 5 is obtained representing the 
expected capital Et(Kt) as a function of the lag of capital Kt-1 and the costs of bank’s risk 
exposure γt+i and the remuneration cost αt+I (cost of capital).
                    (5)
In order to obtain the capital buffer from equation 5, the regulatory capital  (based on 
minimum legally prescribed rate of capital adequacy) should be deducted from both sides, 
and also, the expected capital should be replaced by the observed capital and equation 6 
is thus arrived at.
                    (6)
Thus, based on the above represented mathematical derivation, the capital buffer within 
equation 6 depends: (1) directly proportionally on the lag value  representing the 
adjustment cost i.e. the transaction cost needed for the bank to obtain sufficient capital, (2) 
directly proportionally on the bank’s risk exposure γt+I, (3) inversely proportionally on the 
bank’s cost of capital αt+i. 
Review of the empirical literature
Most frequently referenced papers regarding the determinants of the banks’ capital buffer 
are: Ayuso et al. (2002), Lindquist (2003), Stolz and Wedow (2005) and Jokipii and Milne 
(2006). These papers mostly concentrate on investigating the movements of the capital 
buffer depending on the economic cycle, i.e. they explore macro-prudential dimension 
of the capital buffer as a tool for reducing the systemic risk. Namely, the importance of 
investigating the dependence of the capital buffer on economic cycles is perceived from the 
aspect of counter-cyclical or pro-cyclical role of the banks in the economy. As a prerequisite 
for continuous growth of economies where banks are dominant players in the financial 
sector, the banks have to lend in an unconstrained manner. Thus, in periods of economic 
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expansion the banks provide more credit in the economy and consequently credit risk 
starts to build.  In contrast, when the economy is in a phase of recession, the banks face 
materialization of credit risks. Therefore, it would be prudent for banks to increase their 
level of capital during economic expansion since capital is more likely to be cheaper on 
the capital market at that time and, in parallel, the banks will be able to build in a timely 
fashion the capital buffer for absorbing the losses that might arise during adverse economic 
developments. If banks behave in this manner, then the change in the economic cycle from 
expansion to recession would not cause them to reduce lending in order to maintain the 
capital adequacy rate above the minimum legally prescribed, and would not in turn deepen 
the economic recession i.e. the banks will act counter-cyclically. Regarding the econometric 
modeling in these empirical papers, they start from the theoretical model described in 
Ayuso et al. (2002) and include the economic cycle variable as well as variables for banks’ 
exposure to various risks (credit, market, etc..), profitability variable (cost of capital), lag of 
the capital buffer (lag of the dependent variable) to cover the adjustment costs of holding 
the capital, and various additional variables, such as the size of banks etc, in order to make 
a more comprehensive econometric modeling.
In the first mentioned paper Ayuso et al. (2002), the authors examined the determinants of 
the capital buffer for the Spanish banks for the period 1986 to 2000. The paper uses annual 
data, where the capital buffer is the dependent variable, calculated as a percentage i.e 
the current capital decreased by the regulatory required capital divided by the regulatory 
capital, and as independent variables are used: lag of capital buffer in order to cover the 
adjustment cost of capital, the rate of non-performing loans, the rate of return on equity, 
dummy variables for distinguishing the banks by size and the gross domestic product growth 
rate as a measure of the economic cycle. The econometric modeling is done by using panel 
econometric technique. The findings of this paper suggest that Spanish banks are quite 
imprudent in terms of capital buffer management. Namely, the rate of non-performing loans 
affects negatively the capital buffer, which means that the materialization of the credit risk 
has been covered at the expense of the capital. The rate of return on equity also affects 
negatively, implying that profits are not reinvested to increase the capital. Furthermore, 
the dummy variable for capturing the size of the banks has a negative influence on the 
capital buffer, indicating that large banks hold less capital than smaller banks. Finally, the 
relationship between economic cycle and capital buffer is also negative, i.e. when GDP 
grows, banks decrease the capital buffer, and hence, the banks behave pro-cyclically in the 
economy.
Lindquist (2003) examines the determinants of the capital buffer for Norwegian banks for 
the period from Q3 1992 to Q4 2001 by using a panel econometric technique. Lindquist 
defined the capital buffer as the ratio between excess of capital and the risk weighted 
assets. The variables included in this paper can be presented into five categories. The first 
category of variables ensures the banks’ ability to provide capital. Therefore, the variables 
that have been taken in this group are: the real interest rate on bonds with maturity of 10 
years, the variance of the banks’ profit, the size of the banks measured by total balance 
and off-balance exposure and loan loss provisions. The second category is a variable that 
reflects the riskiness of the portfolio, to be precise, the risk profile of the banks’ assets. The 
third category is a variable that represents the discipline imposed by the competition, i.e. it 
is the capital buffer of competing banks. The fourth category contains a variable measured 
by the number of completed on-site supervisions and the fifth category contains variable to 
address the economic cycle, the growth rate of the gross domestic product. The specific of 
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this paper that sets it apart from the theoretical model explained above is that the author 
has not included the lag of the dependent variable in order to encompass the adjustment 
cost. The results obtained in this paper imply that banks in Norway are prudent in terms 
of the economic cycle and competitive pressure. Namely, during positive economic cycle 
banks increase their capital buffer and also competitive pressures affect banks to increase 
capital. The imprudence of the Norwegian banks is perceived only in terms of the riskiness 
of their portfolio. The estimated negative coefficient before this variable indicates that banks 
increase capital when taking higher risk.
The paper by Stolz and Wedow (2005) investigates the same issue for German banks 
for the period 1993-2003. The authors define the capital buffer as a difference between 
the rate of capital adequacy and legally minimum prescribed rate of 8%. As independent 
variables used in this paper are: lag of the dependent variable, variables for covering the 
credit risk costs, profitability, size and gross domestic product for the economic cycle. Also, 
additional variables are included for encompassing banks’ mergers within the observed 
period, their disposable liquidity, as well as the type of banks in the German economy. The 
results indicate a negative influence of profitability, the economic cycle and the size of banks 
on the capital buffer and a positive impact of liquidity and mergers.
Similarly to previously described studies, Jokipii and Milne (2006) also investigate the 
determinants of the capital buffer and put emphasis on the influence of the economic cycle. 
This study covers the period from 1997 to 2004 and takes into account the banks from EU 
member countries. Panel econometric technique is used, including standard variables for 
the adjustment costs of capital, profitability, exposure to credit risk covered by the rate of 
non-performing loans and the rate of loan loss provisions to total assets, the level of loans 
and the loan growth, the size of the banks and the economic cycle expressed by the gross 
domestic product. The results of this paper suggest that the increased profitability, the size 
of banks and the economic cycle affect negatively the capital buffer, while the exposure to 
credit risk has a positive influence.
Econometric model specification, data and methodology 
Having in mind the above elaborated theoretical model and the review of the empirical 
literature, the econometric testing of the determinants of capital buffer of the banking sector in 
RM will be done by using standard variables for covering the bank’s exposure to risks (credit 
and market), profitability variable (cost of capital) and the economic cycle. The following 
time series variables will be included as independent variables: non-performing loans rate 
(NPL) and non-performing loans coverage with loan loss provisions (COVERAGE), loans 
growth rate (LOANSGR), net open currency position to regulatory capital (OCP), return 
on equity (ROE), gross domestic product growth rate (GDPGR) and loans to GDP gap 
(difference) from its’ trend level (LOANSGAP). Dependent variable is the capital buffer 
(BUFFER) calculated as a difference between the rate of capital adequacy and legally 
prescribed minimum adequacy ratio of 8%. All variables are expressed in percentages.
The rate of non-performing loans to gross loans (NPL) and non-performing loans coverage 
with loan loss provisions (COVERAGE) represent ex-post measures of the credit risk of 
the banks i.e. measures of the already materialized credit risk losses. The impact of these 
variables should be positive. The positive effect indicates that higher the credit risk the banks 
Milan Eliskovski
24  | JCEBI, Vol.1 (2014) No.2, pp. 19 - 33   
have undertaken should stimulate them to increase the capital and thus to protect against 
unexpected losses. The coefficient of NPL variable should be higher than the coefficient 
before COVERAGE variable because loan loss provisions are alternative buffer, protecting 
the banks against the expected losses. Negative coefficients in front of these two variables 
would imply that Macedonian banks are imprudent meaning that they take credit risk at 
reduced level capital (D’Avack and Levasseur, 2007).
The growth rate of loans (LOANSGR) is a variable covering ex-ante credit risk exposure 
undertaken by the banks. Namely, the banks start to build their credit risk at the moment of 
granting the loan and losses eventually materialize after a certain period of time when a loan 
becomes non-performing due to delays in the repaynent. Therefore, prudent banks should 
increase their capital in parallel with the increased lending and hence, a positive coefficient 
is expected in front of this variable. Negative coefficient would imply short-sightedness of 
the banks in their projections for capital (Tabak et al. 2011).
The net open currency position to regulatory capital (OCP) is taken as a proxy variable to 
cover the market risk of the banks. Similar to the previous variables, the expected impact 
of this variable on the capital buffer is positive so that the banks may cover any losses from 
changes in currency rates.
The rate of return on equity (ROE) is used to capture the profitability i.e. the cost of capital. 
As explained above in the theoretical models, ROE is a cost for the bank and reward for 
the bank’s shareholders. If the profit is distributed as dividend, then there is no source for 
increasing the bank’s capital buffer. However, according to Jokipii and Milne (2006), if ROE 
is high enough in that it exceeds the shareholders’ expected return, then excess profits can 
be reinvested and thus have a positive impact on the capital buffer.
The gross domestic product growth rate (GDPGR) is included as a measure of the economic 
cycle. A negative coefficient in front of this variable indicates that banks increase their 
capital buffer during economic recession, which could in turn restrict their lending, and thus 
the recession could deepen.
The gap (difference) of loans to GDP from its’ trend level (LOANSGAP) is proposed by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision with the latest Basel Accord (Basel III) for 
regulating the banking sector pro-cyclicality. In fact, this variable should indicate whether 
the lending level in the economy is excessive and accordingly, the banks should provide 
additional capital or so called counter-cyclical buffer2 (Gersl and Seidler, 2012). According to 
the Basel Committee suggestions, the loans to GDP variable trend should be calculated by 
using a Hodrick - Prescott (HP) filter3. The countercyclical capital buffer that banks need to 
provide should range from 0% to 2.5% relative to respective difference of 2 to 10 percentage 
points of the loans to GDP from its’ trend level. If LOANSGAP variable is negative, then the 
banks are not obliged to provide counter-cyclical capital buffer.
Similarly as Lindquist (2003), the econometric model in this study does not contain lag 
of capital buffer as an independent variable. According to Boucinha (2008) this makes 
2  Basel Accord (Basel III) also suggests to the banks to provide previously an additional amount of capital (conservation 
buffer),in a case they have a low rate of capital adequacy.
3  According to Gersl and Seidler (2012), the lambda parameter for calculating the HP filter when using quarterly data should 
be set at 400,000. This high amount of lambda parameter is proposed because the credit cycle lasts longer than the economic 
cycle.
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the Lindquist (2003) model miss specified, but it is not to be taken as misspecification in 
this paper. Namely, according to De Bondt and Prast (1999), Kleff and Weber (2004) and 
D’Avack and Levasseur (2007), for economies with underdeveloped capital market, such 
as Macedonian economy, the reinvested profit is the most important source for increasing 
the capital buffer. Taking into consideration the fact that the Macedonian Stock Exchange 
is characterized by poor development and lack of liquidity4 as well as included ROE as one 
of the independent variables in the econometric model, the significance of eventual wrong 
econometric specification is reduced.
The data for the independent variables relating to the Macedonian banking sector risk 
exposure and profitability are taken from the website of the NBRM5. GDPGR variable is 
taken from the State Statistical Office. Quarterly data are used for the period from 2003Q2 
to 2013Q3. LOANSGR variable is calculated on a quarterly basis and GDPGR is calculated 
annually.
In order to eliminate multicollinearity between independent variables, a correlation analysis 
is presented in Table 1. The results in Table 1 indicate the highest collinearity of -0.91 
between NPL and COVERAGE variables.
Table 1. Multicollinearity analysis between independent variables
NPL COVERAGE OCP ROE LOANSGR GDPGR LOANSGAP
NPL 1.00
COVERAGE -0.91 1.00
OCP 0.69 -0.51 1.00
ROE -0.33 0.43 0.38 1.00
LOANSGR 0.12 0.07 0.70 0.73 1.00
GDPGR 0.10 0.04 0.54 0.58 0.65 1.00
LOANSGAP -0.46 0.36 -0.27 0.23 0.00 -0.25 1.00
Source: Author’s calculations
In order to avoid multicollinearity between NPL and COVERAGE and over-parameterization 
by including too many independent variables as well as to check the robustness of the 
coefficients, the following four regressions will be estimated:
4  The market capitalization to GDP as a measure of size and stock turnover to GDP as a measure of liquidity of the Macedonian 
Stock Exchange is relatively low at an average of 7.16% and 1.43%, respectively, for the period from 1996 by 2012 (see World 
Development Indicators).
5  For the variables BUFFER, NPL, COVERAGE and ROE, the available quarterly data cover the period 2004Q4 to 2013Q3 
and for the variable OCP quarterly data are available from 2006Q1 to 2013Q3. Concerning the previous periods, the data are 
annual for these variables. Therefore, in order to cover these data gaps and econometric results to be valid by encompassing 
a period of at least 10 years, the annual data for the above variables before 2004Q4 and 2006Q1 have been interpolated in a 
simple manner i.e. the annual value is allocated to the appropriate quarters.
Milan Eliskovski
26  | JCEBI, Vol.1 (2014) No.2, pp. 19 - 33   
The choice of the appropriate methodology for estimating these regressions depends on 
the integrative features of each individual variable (stationary or non stationary variables) 
as well as on their endogenous nature. Therefore, the Johansen cointegration technique 
(Vector Error Correction Model) will be applied as the most appropriate in order to estimate 
the regressions 7, 8, 9 and 10. The Johansen technique allows variables to be taken with 
the same order of integration and uses lags in order to mitigate the problem that might 
arise from the endogenous variables (Haris and Sollis, 2003). Additionally, this technique 
provides long-run equilibrium coefficients and the error correction mechanism (ECM) which 
presents the speed of adjustment of short-run disequilibrium towards long-run equilibrium. 
It should be noted that all studies presented in the literature review given above use panel 
econometric techniques. The data for the Macedonian banks are mostly available at the 
level of the total banking sector for the given period from 2003Q2 to 2013Q3 (individual 
banks data are not available for this period) and therefore the VECM technique is the most 
appropriate econometric technique to be used in this study, rather than panel econometric 
technique.
Estimation of the econometric model and results
Before applying the Johansen co-integration technique, each variable included in the 
empirical model has to be tested for its order of integration i.e. checking whether the variables 
are stationary or non-stationary. Therefore, two tests were used: Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) and Phillips Perron (PP). The results of the unit root tests are presented in the table 2.
Table 2. ADF test results
Variable
ADF test
Conclusion
Level First differentiation
t 
statistics
Critical 
value  
at 1%
Critical 
value  
at 5%
t 
statistics
Critical 
value  
at 1%
Critical 
value  
at 5%
BUFFER -2.73 -3.60 -2.94 -3.59 -3.61 -2.94 I(1)**
NPL -3.02 -3.60 -2.94 -5.63 -3.61 -2.94 I(1)*
COVERAGE -2.62 -3.60 -2.94 -6.28 -3.61 -2.94 I(1)*
OCP -1.19 -3.60 -2.94 -6.01 -3.61 -2.94 I(1)*
ROE -2.07 -3.60 -2.94 -8.16 -3.61 -2.94 I(1)*
LOANSGR -1.14 -3.60 -2.94 -9.12 -3.61 -2.94 I(1)*
GDPGR -2.89 -3.60 -2.94 -8.61 -3.61 -2.94 I(1)*
LOANSGAP -1.16 -3.60 -2.94 -6.63 -3.61 -2.94 I(1)*
*, ** The null hypothesis is rejected at 1% and 5% level of significance
Source: Author’s calculations
The results of both tests for stationarity indicate that the variables are non-stationary in 
the levels and they become stationary after the first differentiation, or are integrated of first 
order I(1). Furthermore, the Johansen co-integration procedure proceeds with determining 
the order of Vector Auto Regression (VAR) and identification of how many lags need to be 
included in the regression in order to mitigate the endogenous problem. For the order of 
VAR, information criteria such as: Likelihood Ratio (LR), Final Prediction Error (FPE), Akaike 
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(AIC), Schwarc (SC) and Hannan-Quinn (HQ) will be considered and the choice depends on 
the compliance of the majority of these criteria regarding the appropriate lag. Additionally, a 
review of the residual diagnostic tests (serial correlation, normality and homoscedasticity) 
will be carried out in order to check the validity of the chosen VAR based on the information 
criteria. The results of the information criteria and diagnostic tests for the regressions from 
7 to 10 are presented in tables 4 to 11.
Table 3. PP test results
Variable
PP test
Conclusion
Level First differentiation
t 
statistics
Critical 
value  
at 1%
Critical 
value  
at 5%
t 
statistics
Critical 
value  
at 1%
Critical 
value  
at 5%
BUFFER -2.74 -3.60 -2.94 -5.61 -3.61 -2.94 I(1)*
NPL -3.11 -3.60 -2.94 -5.63 -3.61 -2.94 I(1)*
COVERAGE -2.62 -3.60 -2.94 -6.28 -3.61 -2.94 I(1)*
OCP -1.15 -3.60 -2.94 -6.56 -3.61 -2.94 I(1)*
ROE -2.09 -3.60 -2.94 -8.28 -3.61 -2.94 I(1)*
LOANSGR -1.74 -3.60 -2.94 -9.04 -3.61 -2.94 I(1)*
GDPGR -2.98 -3.60 -2.94 -8.51 -3.61 -2.94 I(1)*
LOANSGAP -1.14 -3.60 -2.94 -6.63 -3.61 -2.94 I(1)*
*, ** The null hypothesis is rejected at 1% and 5% level of significance
Source: Author’s calculations
Table 4. VAR lag order selection criteria’s for the regression 7
BUFFER = f(NPL, OCP, ROE, LOANSGR, GDPGR)
 Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 NA 35754.1800 27.5116 27.7676 27.6034
1 223.8570 212.4196 22.3622   24.15377*   23.00502*
2   52.70275*   202.9552*   22.18136* 25.5085 23.3751
3 26.5587 499.9117 22.6996 27.5623 24.4443
* indicates the order of VAR according to each criterion
Source: Author’s calculations
Table 5. Diagnostic tests for the regression 7
Diagnostic tests for VAR = 2 in the regression 7; BUFFER = f(NPL, OCP, ROE, LOANSGR, GDPGR)
 Calculated statistics
Critical value 
at 1% Conclusion
H0: No serial correlation in the residuals 38.47 58.62  
H0: Normality in the residuals 40.33 26.22 *
H0: Homoscedastic residuals 491.01 576.49  
* indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% level of significance
Source: Author’s calculations
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Table 6. VAR lag order selection criteria’s for the regression 8
BUFFER = f(NPL, OCP, ROE, LOANSGAP)
 Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 NA 16043.3700 23.8724 24.0857 23.9489
1 248.9590 30.9739 17.6102 18.88988* 18.06935*
2 39.41547* 29.18832* 17.48457* 19.8306 18.3263
3 23.7509 44.7559 17.7340 21.1464 18.9583
* indicates the order of VAR according to each criterion
Source: Author’s calculations
Table 7. Diagnostic tests for the regression 8
Diagnostic tests for VAR = 2 in the regression 8; BUFFER = f(NPL, OCP, ROE, LOANSGAP)
 Calculated statistics
Critical value 
at 1% Conclusion
H0: No serial correlation in the residuals 26.49 44.31  
H0: Normality in the residuals 27.88 23.21 *
H0: Homoscedastic residuals 316.30 359.91  
* indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% level of significance
Source: Author’s calculations
Table 8. VAR lag order selection criteria’s for the regression 9
BUFFER = f(COVERAGE, OCP, ROE, LOANSGR, GDPGR)
 Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 NA 766081.1000 30.5762 30.8322 30.6681
1 222.9097 4688.1230 25.4565 27.24799* 26.09925*
2 56.03838* 3939.919* 25.14729* 28.4744 26.3410
3 31.2442 7677.7980 25.4312 30.2940 27.1759
* indicates the order of VAR according to each criterion
Source: Author’s calculations
Table 9. Diagnostic tests for the regression 9
Diagnostic tests for VAR = 2 in the regression 9; BUFFER = f(COVERAGE, OCP, ROE, 
LOANSGR, GDPGR)
 Calculated statistics
Critical value 
at 1% Conclusion
H0: No serial correlation in the residuals 46.08 58.62  
H0: Normality in the residuals 10.95 26.22  
H0: Homoscedastic residuals 510.37 576.49  
* indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% level of significance
Source: Author’s calculations
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Table 10. VAR lag order selection criteria’s for the regression 10
BUFFER = f(COVERAGE, OCP, ROE, LOANSGAP)
 Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 NA 511876.1000 27.3352 27.5484 24.4117
1 250.4034 945.9259 21.0292 22.30890* 21.48837*
2 40.74217* 850.1430* 20.8562 23.2023 21.6980
3 30.9371 953.7629 20.79317* 24.2056 22.0175
* indicates the order of VAR according to each criterion
Source: Author’s calculations
Table 11. Diagnostic tests for the regression 10
Diagnostic tests for VAR = 2 in the regression 10; BUFFER = f(COVERAGE, OCP, ROE, 
LOANSGAP)
 Calculated statistics
Critical value 
at 1% Conclusion
H0: No serial correlation in the residuals 36.38 44.31  
H0: Normality in the residuals 24.10 23.21 *
H0: Homoscedastic residuals 325.57 359.91  
* indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% level of significance
Source: Author’s calculations
As can be seen from Tables 4, 6, 8 and 10, the majority of information criteria suggest 
the involvement of two lags or value of VAR = 2 within the regressions7, 8, 9 and 10 
and in addition the results of the diagnostic tests suggest appropriate specificity of all 
four regression equations under the order of VAR = 2 despite the rejection of the normal 
distribution hypothesis in the tables 5, 7 and 11.The rejection of the normality hypothesis 
can render invalid t and F tests of the coefficients for all four regressions. Nevertheless, 
according to Gujarati (2003), the non fulfillment of the assumption of the normal distribution 
of the residuals, does not necessarily mean misspecification of the regressions given the 
fulfillment of the homoscedasticity hypothesis and the size of the sample under investigation. 
Since homoscedasticity hypothesis is not rejected in any of the specifications presented in 
the tables 5, 7, 9 and 11, and the sample in this paper for the period 2003Q2 to 2013Q3 is 
the longest available sample for the Macedonian banking sector, it can be considered that 
t and F tests asymptotically follow normal distribution and therefore the regressions are 
correctly specified.
The next step in the Johansen co-integration analysis is to test for the presence of the co-
integration vectors among the variables in the regressions 7, 8, 9 and 10. Two test statistics 
are available for this purpose; the first one is based on the trace of the stochastic matrix and 
the second one on the maximum Eigen value of the stochastic matrix. In this study, only the 
trace of the stochastic matrix test will be considered because of its’ advantage that can be 
drawn when the residuals are not normally distributed (Harris and Sollis, 2003).
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Table 12. Co-integration rank test: trace statistics for the regressions 7, 8, 9 and 10
 
Regression 7 Regression 8 Regression 9 Regression 10
Trace  
stat
Critical 
value 
at 1%
Trace 
stat
Critical 
value 
at 1%
Trace  
stat
Critical 
value 
at 1%
Trace 
stat
Critical 
value 
at 5%
Null hypothesis: no co-
integration 129.35 127.71 80.28 77.82 127.45 127.16 73.99 69.82
Alternative hypothesis: at 
most 1 co-integration vector 93.47 97.6 47.54 54.68 93.18 97.12 46.44 47.86
Source: Author’s calculations
According to the trace of the stochastic matrix test there is one co-integration vector at 1 
percent level of significance for the regressions 7 to 9 and 5 per cent level of significance 
for the regression 10.Obtaining one cointegration vector implies that the vector can be 
normalized upon the dependent variable i.e. BUFFER. When normalized with respect to 
BUFFER, it is obtained the following co-integration vector.
Table 13. Normalized co-integrating vectors and estimated long run coefficients 
for the regressions 7, 8, 9 and 10
 Regression 7 Regression 8 Regression 9 Regression 10
NPL 0.70 * 0.80 *   
Standard errors (0.1) (0.17)   
COVERAGE   0.16 ** 0.17
Standard errors   (0.06) (0.2)
OCP 0.06 ** 0.05 0.29 * 0.35 *
Standard errors (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09)
ROE 0.19 * 0.21 ** -0.13 0.14
Standard errors (0.06) (0.1) (0.08) (0.31)
LOANSGR -0.37 *  -1.05 *  
Standard errors (0.1)  (0.2)  
GDPGR -0.09  -0.17  
Standard errors (0.07)  (0.14)  
LOANSGAP  -0.06  -0.59
Standard errors  (0.09)  (0.38)
Speed of adjustment (ЕCМ) 0.08 0.18 ** -0.12 0.03
Standard errors (0.16) (0.08) (0.08) (0.02)
* and ** indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected at 1% and 5% level of signifficance
Source: Author’s calculations
The results for the estimated coefficients regarding the regressions 7, 8, 9 and 10, shown 
in the table 13 indicate that the capital buffer of the Macedonian banking sector is generally 
determined by its exposure to risks and the profitability and not from the economic cycle. The 
results indicate that variables for the ex-post exposure to credit risk (NPL and COVERAGE) 
have a positive influence on BUFFER. The average effect of increasing NPL by one 
percentage point is 0.7 and 0.8 percentage points in the regressions 7 and 8 respectively, 
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under the condition that other factors remain unchanged, while COVERAGE coefficient is 
statistically significant only in the regression 9 and has an average effect of 0.16 percentage 
points. In compliance with the theory explained above, the coefficient before COVERAGE 
variable is with lower magnitude than the coefficient before NPL. LOANGR as ex-ante 
measure of credit risk is with a negative coefficient and it is -0.37 in the regression 7and 
-1.05 in the regression 9. OCP manifested statistically significant positive effect on BUFFER 
by 0.06; 0.29 and 0.35 percentage points in the regressions 7, 9 and 10, and its effect is not 
statistically significant in the regression 8.
ROE, as expected, manifested a positive and statistically significant impact in the regression 
7 and 8. Regressions 7 and 8 imply an influence of ROE of 0.19 and 0.21 percentage point 
on the BUFFER, under ceteris paribus.
The coefficients for the economic cycle variables GDPGR and LOANSGAP suggest a 
negative and statistically insignificant impact on BUFFER in all regressions. This result 
is probably due to the fact that lending in Macedonian economy as a transition economy 
has not yet reached its equilibrium level, and probably another reason would be that the 
Macedonian GDP has not suffered from significant endogenous shocks would affect the 
banking sector significantly to increase the capital at the expense of limited credit.
The coefficient in front of the Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) measures the speed of 
adjustment of the BUFFER to its equilibrium level. The negative sign of this coefficient 
will allow the dependent variable to reach its’ equilibrium level. Namely, if the dependent 
variable is above the long-term equilibrium, then the negative value of this coefficient 
allows that it be reduced and equilibrium be reached. ECM coefficient in the regressions 
7, 9 and 10 is positive, but statistically insignificant. The statistical insignificance of this 
coefficient probably indicates that the capital buffer of the Macedonian banking sector is in 
the initial equilibrium. This result is likely due to the high level of capitalization of the banks in 
Macedonia. The ECM coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level only 
in the regression 8 and implies that the disequilibrium of the BUFFER expands.
Conclusion and recommendations for the policy makers
The estimated coefficients before ex-post (NPL and COVERAGE) and ex-ante measures 
(LOANSGR) of the credit risk exposure of the Macedonian banks indicate that banks have 
no tendency to create capital much earlier during the lending, but afterwards, when the 
credit risk materializes. The econometric results also indicate that banks increase their 
capital buffer when market risk increases, while the economic cycle has not statistically 
significant effect.
It can be concluded from the results that banks in Macedonia are shortsighted, viewed 
from the perspective that they do not respond to ex-ante credit risk. As mentioned above, 
according to Tabak et al. (2011), banks that do not allocate capital in terms of credit 
growth are myopic because they do not allocate capital anticipatively to protect against 
unexpected losses from the materialized credit risk in the future. However, the good thing 
is that Macedonian banks reinvest their earnings as indicated by ROE variable and partially 
mitigate this problem of shortsightedness.
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From that perspective, the recommendations of this study indicate that NBRM is required 
to prepare research and econometric models to determine the equilibrium level of loans in 
the Macedonian economy as implied by the Basel III Accord. By monitoring the equilibrium 
level of loans, NBRM can act proactively by prescribing a macro-prudential rule which would 
impose an obligation on the banks to increase their capital whenever loans deviate upward 
of their equilibrium level. In this way, the stability of the Macedonian banking sector will 
be further strengthened. Additional recommendation based on the findings of this paper 
is taking additional measures to stimulate the development of the Macedonian Stock 
Exchange. With a developed stock exchange, banks will have easier access to alternative 
sources of capital, besides their reinvested profits.
To overcome the shortcomings of this study, we give a recommendation to other researchers 
who would work on this issue. This research in the future could be improved by using panel 
techniques. Also, it would be good to include variable for the size of the banks and the 
deposits in the economy, in order to determine whether banks follow moral hazard. The big 
banks that fulfill the criteria too big to fail usually are predisposed to maintain less capital, 
because they believe that if getting into financial problems, they will be bailed out by the 
state. The impact of deposits on capital buffer should also be explored in terms of moral 
hazard. Namely, in terms of insured deposits, banks exhibit risky behavior and might not 
increase the capital because of the existence of the deposit insurance fund to cover the cost 
of depositors if banks are faced with eventual problems.
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